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WHAT IS VIRTUOUS ABOUT FAITH?
James Muyskens
When thinking uncritically, we often think of Christian faith as belief: accepting
as true the doctrines of Christianity. But then it is difficult to see how faith can
be a virtue or unbelief a sin. What is praiseworthy or blameworthy about believing
or disbelieving a set of statements? If, despite conscientious efforts at evidence
gathering, we are mistaken about the strength of the evidence and thus believe
what is false or disbelieve what is true, does that mean we are bad or sinful or
just that we may not be as clever as others who got it right?
True belief alone (getting it right) does not get us very far. We all know people
who firmly believe (and let's assume correctly) that there is life after death; yet
their actions, their aspirations, and their life-projects are seldom guided by this
belief. Others, to draw a sharp contrast, like S0ren Kierkegaard's Socrates profess
ignorance about even so central a religious doctrine as life after death; yet in all
they do they make the possibility of immortality guidance for their lives. As
Kierkegaard says of Socrates: "On this 'if' he risks his entire life, he has the
courage to meet death, and he has with the passion of the infinite so determined
the pattern of his life that it must be found acceptable-if there is an immortality. "1
Surely there is greater virtue in Socrates' agnosticism than in these believers'
belief. Indeed, as Kierkegaard maintains, those without belief have the greater
faith.
Philosophers in the Socratic tradition-and especially Post-Enlightenment
philosophers-aim to apportion belief, that is, assent to a proposition, to the
strength of the epistemic grounds for it, taking care in belief-formation to minimize
the influence of wants, wishes, needs, and desires. Not taking such care is
recognized as an intellectual vice. Those whose considered judgment is that the
support for a proposition is weak but who try to force themselves to believe in
spite of it, are not (at least in this tradition) moral or intellectual heroes; they
are more likely to be objects of pity or derision than praise. Yet is such an act
of will (a "will to believe") the virtue of faith?
Beliefs are not the sort of thing we can simply decide here and now to have
or not to have. Try as we may, we cannot make ourselves believe "seven
impossible things before breakfast." Yet over a period of time we can come to
hold particular beliefs in large part because we want or need very much to hold
them. Is this the course of action being recommended by talk of the virtue of
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faith? Frequently beliefs acquired in this manner while lacking epistemic support
are rejected as "wishful thinking," an all too common sort of irrationality. By
calling faith a virtue are we putting wishful thinking on a pedestal?
Who among us has not been thoroughly exasperated by the person who resolves
to retain his belief come hell or high water, refusing to consider other alternatives
or to respond to any challenges? Yet, if the belief in question is one of core
Christian doctrine or is one acquired via a (putative) revelation is such obstinancy
a virtue? Despite our general disapproval of such believing and our willingness
to condemn as fanatics the faithful of other religions (e.g., Shihite Moslems)
when their belief is not based on thoughtful reflection, when it lacks broad
episternic support and countenances no challenges, is believing Christian doctrine,
come what may, the virtue of faith?
Surely the answer to each of these questions must be no. Virtuous faith is not
obstinately believing a set of statements. Indeed, its virtue may have nothing to
do with firmly believing religious propositions: it appears to be present even
among those in Socratic ignorance. What then is the virtue of faith? And is the
virtue of faith an intellectual vice?
I. What is the Virtue of Faith?

The key element of virtuous faith in Robert Adams' penetrating and helpful
recent discussion of these issues 2 is trust-trust that expresses itself as confidence
in God and the willingness to be entirely dependent upon His power, justice,
and goodness. The faith that Adams wants to show is a virtue is a confident
faith. Lack of trust in God, the failure to rely on His power, justice, and goodness,
is the sin of unbelief.
I wish to argue, in opposition to Adams, that it isfidelity rather than trust that
makes faith a virtue. While I agree that the trusting relationship with God that
Adams portrays is the goal of all Christians, those who have attained the goal
are not the sole possessors of the virtue of faith. Immanuel Kant in the Critique
of Judgment introduces the notion of doubtful faith, contrasted with trusting faith
in his Lectures on Ethics. 3 Doubtful faith as well as the trusting faith described
by Adams is, I shall argue, a virtue. That is, what makes faith a virtue is to be
found in dOUbting as well as in trusting faith.
Doubtful faith is a state of mind in which one is aware of the "objective
insufficiency" of the grounds for believing that the object of faith obtains. The
"objective insufficiency" can result in one's having radical doubts, including
doubts about whether the object of faith obtains. Yet the state of mind is one of
faith since the person continues to pursue his goal, and acts as ifhe were certain
that that toward which he aims obtains. Paul Tillich in Dynamics of Faith gives
us an account of doubtful faith.
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Where there is daring and courage there is the possibility of failure.
And in every act of faith this possibility is present. The risk must be
taken ... Only certain is the ultimacy as ultimacy, the infinite passion as
infinite passion. This is a reality given to the self with his own nature ....
But there is not certainty of this kind about the content of our concern,
be it nation, success, a god, or the God of the Bible: Their acceptance
as matters of ultimate concern is a risk and therefore an act of courage .... the risk to faith in one's ultimate concern is indeed the greatest
risk a man can run. For if it proves to be a failure, the meaning of one's
life breaks down; one surrenders oneself, including truth and justice,
to something which is not worth it. .. .If faith is understood as belief
that something is true, doubt is incompatible with the act of faith. If
faith is understood as being ultimately concerned, doubt is a necessary
element in it. It is a consequence of the risk of faith.4
To see whether doubtful faith is also a virtue, it is useful to consider what we
mean when we speak of faith as a gift and as fidelity. Considerations emanating
from these features of faith have a direct bearing on how we construe talk of
the virtue of faith.
A. Faith is spoken of as a gift. For example, St. Paul in I. Corinthians 12
lists (among others) miracles, prophecy, healing, and a deep faith in God as
gifts of the Spirit: "All these are inspired by one and the same Spirit; who
apportions to each one individually as he wills." If we are to construe talk of
the gift of faith in a straightforward manner, having faith (more precisely possessing that part of faith that is a gift) would appear not to be a virtue and the
failure to have it not to be a sin. If those who have faith are the recipients of a
gift-an undeserved favor, an act of grace (freely conferred)-and all those
without faith have not received the gift, it would seem quite inappropriate to
consider those without faith to be culpable or to praise those who have it. The
necessary conditions for praising another or for ascribing responsibility to another
appear not to be present.
It is not clear whether Adams would disagree with this. He does challenge
the grounds that seem to me most suitable for establishing the thesis that one
cannot be held culpable for failing to possess a gift, namely, the following
principle: We are justified in holding a person responsible for a shortcoming or
deficiency only if we believe he could have acted otherwise or could be otherwise
had he not (at earlier times) made certain decisions and performed certain voluntary actions including neglecting to attend to things he could have attended to.
Adams says: "There are many cognitive failures that we regard as morally
reprehensible .... These failures are not in general voluntary."5 Adams is not
simply making the obvious point that, for example, ignorance that members of
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other tribes or races are bearers of human rights has led to barbaric, reprehensible,
sinful behavior and pernicious institutions. He is suggesting that such deficiencies-even when not attributable to negligence or choice-are culpable.
In particular, Adams finds fault with Alan Donagan's suggestion that an officer
bred up from childhood in the Hitler Jugend might not be culpable for his
ignorance about his duty to noncombatants. 6 In disagreeing with Donagan, he
appears to be saying that such officers are culpable despite the fact that their
cognitive failure may be out of their control and not the result of previous choices.
If this is Adams' position, we must closely examine the grounds he could have
for holding the German officer culpable. To say he is culpable is to say he has
no acceptable excuse for his ignorance. But if we are going to support this claim,
we must offer some criteria for judging an excuse acceptable or unacceptable.
Suppose the officer says: "I didn't know I had any duties to noncombatants. I
was taught that all is fair in love and war." Suppose also that the following is
true: But for his thoughtlessness and callousness, he could have known he had
such duties. He came from a military family and as a small boy heard his uncle
talk with pride about how they as soldiers in the Great War had even risked their
lives to protect noncombatants. Now as a young man the lesson he learned at
his uncle's knee is not applied as he responds to the presence of noncombatants
in the field of battle. If, in these circumstances, we judge the excuse unacceptable
we will support our judgment with the claim that he could have known he had
a duty to noncombatants despite the years of contrary indoctrination in Hitler's
Jugend. Suppose, modifying the example, we have an officer who has had no
comparable childhood experiences. If we reject his excuse our rejection will take
the same form but our appeal will be to such things as (putative) innate knowledge
of moral principles that he could have known but for his carelessness or evil
choices or to principles claimed to be so basic and self-evidently true that simply
by living we can recognize them to be true but for carelessness or evil choices.
These appeals may strike us as less compelling than those to an individual's
experience. Yet they may have some force. Suppose, however, that we make
no effort to demonstrate that the officer could have known better; yet we insist
he is culpable. What basis do we have for our insistence?
Denials of the legitimacy of excuses from ignorance take the following form:
"You could have known but for certain actions or failures of yours. Hence, your
excuse is unacceptable." Wouldn't it be arbitrary and capricious, then, to say:
"Your excuse is unacceptable despite the fact that you have met the normal
requirements for acceptable excuses (you have shown that your ignorance is not
voluntary). "
Adams follows Aristotle in holding that ignorance of moral principle is no
excuse. Yet if I have understood him correctly, he wishes to reject Aristotle's
background assumption that such ignorance is voluntary.7 I have argued that a
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view such as Aristotle's may be plausible. But I find no support for the view
that ignorance of moral principle is no excuse if such ignorance is not voluntary.
Until such support is forthcoming, it is reasonable to hold that we can be held
responsible only for those cognitive failures over which we have control or those
that result from our earlier voluntary actions or negligence.
Applying this to the sin of unbelief or the virtue of faith, only those aspects
of unbelief and faith that are voluntary can be, respectively, the sin of unbelief
or the virtue of faith. Lacking the element of faith that is a gift cannot be a
failure for which we are culpable. (The Spirit "apportions to each one individually
as He wills." Over this apportionment we have no control.) Just as lack of this
aspect of faith cannot be a sin, its possession cannot be a virtue.
What then is the element of faith that is a gift? I suggest that it is the confident
trust that Adams has so attractively described, the trust that arises from a life of
relationship with, and dependence upon, God. If this is correct, then (contrary
to Adams) faith as trust is not a virtue; nor is its lack the sin of unbelief. We
must look to other parts of faith to find the virtue of it, specifically, the element
of fidelity.
B. Especially for those of us deeply influenced by the work of S0ren Kierkegaard, when we think of the paradigm of faith, faithful Abraham, a crucial
element (if not the key element) of his faith is fidelity, endurance, being firm
in his commitment, having an unswerving allegiance. The guiding principle is
"Be thou faithful unto death" (Rev. 2: 10). The emphasis is as much if not more
on being trustworthy as on being trusting, as much on resolve and commitment
as on confidence, as much on endurance and perseverance as on serenity and
security. The Knight of Faith wishes above all to be able to say with St. Paul:
"I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith"
(II Timothy 4:7). Being trustworthy and firm in one's commitment is a matter
of choice. I can decide to persevere despite hardship and (as in Kierkegaard's
account of Abraham's lonely journey up Mount Moriah) in the face of doubts
and fears. Or, of course, I can decide it is too difficult and give up at the first
call for sacrifice. The call to faith is to "run with perseverance the race that is
set before us" (Hebrews 12:1). We can choose to run or not to run. Fidelity is
the voluntary dimension of faith.
II. Fidelity and Confident Faith
One way of drawing the contrast between my understanding of the virtue of
faith and Adams' is as follows: whereas I am inclined to see confident faith
arising after a lifetime of fidelity, he maintains that for there to be faith at all,
it must be trusting faith, confident faith. Trust is the core. Fidelity arises as the
expression of that trust.
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Adams finds an alternative conception of faith such as I have proposed to be
unsatisfactory for, he maintains, it is not a powerful enough force against fear
which can be a pervasive poison and a malignant power in our lives. Without
trust, without full confidence in God we will be plagued by the "fear that God
will let us down."8 Certainly if this were the case, the view I am advocating
should be rejected.
Such fear, however, is not inevitable; nor is the danger of succumbing to it
inordinate. This can be seen to be so even in the most extreme cases of doubt.
Thus it surely is so for the milder forms of doubt more common among the
faithful. Consider then the most extreme case: suppose we wish to live the life
of faith but are tom by doubts, including frequent doubts about God's providential
care, or the veracity of our experiences of God, or whether He exists at all. Not
even such doubt can shake the truth that if God exists He is worthy of our trust,
He can be counted on. This we can know and for this we can hope. Our problem
is the one stated by Tillich in the passage cited above: if that toward which we
direct our hope, our ultimate concern, proves false, the meaning of our lives
breaks down. With greater confidence regarding the reality of the object of our
ultimate concern, we could reduce the risk. Nevertheless, even as we are burdened
with these extreme or radical doubts and are painfully aware of the risk, we can
resolutely press on, continuing to interpret certain of our experiences as encounters
with God. As with Kierkegaard's Socrates, we can live a life that will be found
faithful if that for which we deeply yearn, a relationship with God, turns out to
be a reality for us.
Of course, such a life of faith would not be possible if we were certain God
does not exist or if we believed that He does not. Such belief is incompatible
with faith. But uncertainty and doubt about God's existence are not. Suppose
for any number of reasons (e.g., a recent personal tragedy, preoccupation with
the likely consequences of "big power politics" of nuclear annihilation, or the
challenge of a rigorous atheological argument) we cannot now say with confidence
"I know that my redeemer lives." The resultant uncertainty and tentativeness of
our belief is compatible with perseverance and with fervently hoping that we
will someday achieve the victory of faith. Tentative belief entails neither fearful
nor tentative faith. Our questions and doubts need not cause us to suffer
debilitating fear of failure. They do not entail inactivity or signal a flagging of
commitment. They do, however, test faith. They compel endurance, for they
force recognition that the race of faith is a marathon run over rugged terrain and
is not a Sunday afternoon walk in the park.
Some who find themselves with doubting rather than trusting faith suffer,
according to Adams, from a pernicious form of the sin of unbelief, namely, the
"lust for control of one's own life. "9 In these cases, the commitment to rationality
that feeds the doubt is a ruse for saying no to God's call to put our trust in Him.
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... much of our emotional attachment to rationality has to do with our
counting on it as a crucial part of our intellectual equipment for controlling our lives ... .In Christian faith we are invited to trust a person so
much greater than ourselves that we cannot understand Him very fully.
We have to trust His power and goodness in general, without having a
blueprint of what He is going to do in detail. This is very disturbing
because it entails a loss of our control of our own lives .... the continued
lust for control of one's own life, in preference to opening oneself to
grace, is sin. 10
Such a possibility is cause for concern, requiring careful introspection to
detennine the source of the doubts and to see that they are not undermining the
resolve to be faithful. We must detennine whether in our lives these doubts are
strategems for shutting out the unexpected, the alien, the new, God's grace.
Nevertheless, it would be surprising if all doubts vanished once those motivated
by the lust for control were banished. Reasons to doubt (the lack of epistemic
support), in contrast to these illicit motivations or incentives for doubt (the lust
for control among them), will remain. Does faith require stifling these doubts?
III. Is the Virtue of Faith an Intellectual Vice?

Trust and fidelity both require a willingness to act ahead of the evidence, that
is, to act without full epistemic support, to embark on a venture of uncertain
outcome. Surely no one would deny that we have a right so to act. We are not
duty-bound to remain in our home port until we have epistemic warrant for the
proposition that the venture will be a success. If we were not free to act ahead
of epistemic warrant our lives would be impoverished if not brought to a standstill.
Life and faith are far more than fonning and affinning beliefs. Judging their
value calls for far more than an assessment of the epistemic warrant of beliefs .
The fundamental question of the "ethics of belief," however, is whether these
other factors (our desires, our interests, our affections, our moral obligations,
and so on) have a role to play when evaluating whether beliefs are warranted.
Should we adopt a criterion of reasonable belief that requires that beliefs be
assessed exclusively by reference to epistemic nonns or one that includes as well
considerations of practical (moral and prudential) reasoning? That is, are beliefs
to be judged solely on their intrinsic epistemic worth (the exclusive standard) or
on their instrumental value as well (the inclusive standard)? Adams favors a
criterion of the latter sort, whereas I (for reasons developed elsewhere ll ) favor
the fonner. I happily recognize the richness and complexities of life and that
most of the time the question of a belief's justification is simply beside the point.
But when (for any number of reasons) the question of a belief's justification
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arises, I recommend that our answer be restricted to consideration of epistemic
merit. Our goal (despite its unattainability) should be to withhold belief (assent)
from propositions that we discover lack epistemic warrant.
Determining what our criterion of justified belief ought to be is a complex
undertaking. The position we adopt depends on considerations that are far broader
than those of this essay. For our current purposes it will be sufficient to see the
relationship between the standard of justified belief we adopt and our understanding of the virtue of faith.
In the following example (a frequently discussed analogue to religious faith),
the trust that Adams sees as the virtue of faith can be justified only by means
of an inclusive standard whereas fidelity is justifiable on an exclusive standard.
A man's wife is confronted with substantial but inconclusive evidence of his
infidelity. Given the strength and the length of their relationship and her desire
to sustain it, she is not inclined to take steps to end it or to do anything that
would jeopardize it. She hopes that in time the evidence will be amenable to a
less damaging interpretation than current circumstances permit. She resolves to
remain loyal, to persevere, and to act on the hope that what now appears to be
the case may not be.
She confides in two friends, seeking their advice. One friend says that~espite
the evidence for infidelity-she has a duty to trust her husband. She must continue
to believe that he is faithful. To do less is to renege on her commitment and to
risk destroying the relationship. She asks: suppose that, contrary to this evidence,
he has not been unfaithful, wouldn't he be deeply disappointed and "feel offended
against"12 upon learning that she doubted him? The virtuous course requires
trusting him and thus believing against this evidence.
Her other friend concurs that it is important to act in ways that sustain the
relationship. But he feels that this can and should be done while she keeps her
"eyes open" and weighs the untoward evidence. Given her love for her husband
and her desire that he be faithful, he warns that she should resist giving in to
her strong inclination to ignore the contrary evidence and her deep desire to
believe he is faithful. Responsible believing, not avoidance behavior, is what is
needed. He recommends facing the abyss, the doubts, the anxiety, the fear of
loss, with the resolve that the relationship will not only survive the challenge
but will be enhanced by it. In doing this, she knowingly takes Tillich's risk of
faith: the object of her concern and loyalty may prove "not worth it." His counsel
is that the virtuous course of action requires endurance and fidelity in the face
of adversity and risk but not believing against the evidence. Trust (and the belief
that her husband is faithful) will once again be appropriate if and when additional
evidence and experience provide ground for defeating the current contrary evidence.
The advice of the second friend concerning trusting faith in God would be
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similar: the trust must be grounded in a lifetime of experience. The trust that is
the goal of faith is warranted only after living with fidelity and amassing the
experiences of God that provide the experiential and epistemic ground for this
trust. The "will to trust" that tries to circumvent the travail of doubt and uncertainty
on the way is a short-cut to be avoided. As in Pilgrim's Progress, we must enter
at the right gate so as to complete the entire course with all of its trials and
tribulations before reaching the Celestial City.
IV. The Sin of Unbelief

On Adams' view of faith, the sin of unbelief is lack of trust in God. On the
alternative I am suggesting, the sin of unbelief is lack of fidelity-that is, failure
to stand firm in one's commitment to live as a disciple. Construed this way, the
sin of unbelief can only be committed by a believer. Those who have never
made a commitment cannot fail to live up to it. People who make no religious
commitment may be living in a fallen state and apart from God. Their lives may
well be unfulfilled as a result. There may be much about their lives we can fault.
We can say that they are in a state of sin. But only a believer could commit the
sin of unbelief.
V. Faith, Uncertainty, and Dependence

Uncertainty cannot be avoided in the pilgrimage of faith. In this life we are
aware of God's presence only fleetingly. At best, even those blessed with confident faith only see God "through a glass darkly" and not "face to face." What
distinguishes even the confident faith Adams presents from knowledge and sight
is uncertainty.
Adams' account as to why a relationship with God involving uncertainty is
superior to one of certainty is a gripping one. His argument that full knowledge
of the other in any relationship would reduce the relationship to one of manipulation is convincing. Uncertainty and unpredictability in our relationship with
God protect us from projecting our values and desires onto God and from confidently claiming that God is on our side. We just do not know where the life
of faith will lead us.
In speaking of the uncertainty of faith, Adams acknowledges that often we
cannot know whether what we are inclined to interpret as God's will for us is
a revelation from God or merely "a foolish impulse."\3 He insists, nevertheless,
that we can be confident that God's plan for us and for the world is good and
that our highest good is achievable only through Him.
I have placed greater emphasis than Adams on the uncertainty of faith in order
to include (in the discussion of faith's virtue) doubting as well as trusting faith.
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I have claimed that even among those with radical doubts and adherents of a
stringent "ethics of belief' the virtue of faith can be found. If this is correct,
then the virtue of faith cannot be trust.
What does not follow from this conclusion is that in the final analysis doubting
faith is preferable to trusting faith. On the contrary, Adams makes a compelling
case for the superiority of trusting faith. Trusting faith far more than doubting
faith facilitates development of the sense of absolute or complete dependence
upon God. Trusting faith makes it possible for us to sacrifice some of our control
over our lives, to put our lives in the hands of God and no longer rely on
ourselves. Biblical faith and the faith of the saints exemplify this (see, for
example, Hebrews 11). Clearly one who has this trust has something religiously
desirable-something she or he would prize above all else.
Precisely because of the way trust is related to being dependent, however, it
is not the virtue of faith. As we have seen, virtue is appropriately ascribed to
an individual only if that person is responsible for having acquired it. The trust
of faith is best seen as arising from God's gracious acts toward us and not from
our effort, character, or good works. What better way to stress our dependency
upon God and His initiative and action as the source than by seeing trust as a gift?
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